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13 June 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Bloc-Mali: The bloc is moving quickly to establish economic ties with the Mali Federation in anticipation of the latter's independence on 20 June. A Czech representative recently visited Dakar to discuss the conclusion of trade and technical assistance agreements with Mali officials, who appear interested in the overtures. Should this initial probing meet with success, bloc leaders would probably make other similar offers--presumably including economic aid.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*OK* Japan: Takeo Miki, a leading party rival of Prime Minister Kishi, and an upper-house independent group have made proposals for a Diet recess to cool off the turmoil and provide a truce during President Eisenhower's visit. Ambassador MacArthur says there are some indications the Socialists desire to de-emphasize antitreaty activities, but that they have made no firm decisions on revising their campaign. The pro-Communist labor organization, Sohyo, has called for a general strike of

its membership on 15 June, and other demonstrations during the next few days are likely. Kishi appears still holding firm against pressures for his ouster and apparently hopes the extremist demonstrations will stimulate responsible Japanese to restrain the leftists. [REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

*NO* Cuba: On 10 June, Fidel Castro called the refusal of three Western oil companies to refine Soviet crude a provocative US move to damage the Cuban economy and to force takeovers of the companies' Cuban refineries. An official of one of the US companies believes that no takeover will be made until Cuba is assured of assistance from other sources in maintaining its POL requirements. [REDACTED]

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*25X1* [REDACTED] United Nations: There is increasing sentiment among UN delegates for postponing the opening of the 15th session of the General Assembly from 20 September until after the US elections. Ambassador Lodge expects the issue to be resolved in the next few days. Precedent for postponement was established at the time of the US elections in 1956, and similar action this fall appears likely. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] \*Argentina: A military uprising is reported to have taken place on 12 June in San Luis Province, about 400 miles northwest of Buenos Aires. The action appears to be limited to that province. The military leader of the revolt, retired General Fortunato Giovanoni, in a proclamation accused the Frondizi government of "Marxist and Communist tendencies." None of the top military commanders is known to be supporting the action. The senior commanders, who have majority support in the military establishment, oppose armed action to oust Frondizi despite the sharp rise in discontent in the armed forces in recent weeks over the continued terrorist bombing attacks attributed to the Peronistas.

[redacted]

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Czech Probing in Mali

The bloc is moving quickly to establish economic ties with Mali in anticipation of the latter's independence on 20 June. A Czech commercial representative who visited Dakar earlier this month as a guest of the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan proposed the conclusion of a barter-trade agreement and a technical assistance program with Mali after independence.

The representative suggested an exchange of Czech machinery and agricultural equipment for Mali's chief export, peanuts, and for phosphates and hides. Prague also offered at no cost to Mali to provide technical assistance, including training for Mali students and workers in Czechoslovakia and Czech experts who would be willing to work either in the capital or the interior of the Federation.

Mali officials appeared to be interested in the proposals, and Prague's spokesman indicated a Czech mission would come to Dakar in July or August to pursue the matter. A return visit might well provide the occasion for the presentation to Mali of some impact-type independence gifts from Czechoslovakia.

This initial probing in Mali repeats the opening gambit successfully employed by the bloc in 1958 toward Guinea. Mali's acceptance of the Czech overtures would encourage other bloc countries to offer expanded trade and presumably economic aid as well.

There are indications that Mali--the first of the 11 French Community states to obtain independence--is prepared to accept at least limited amounts of bloc aid. The Federation decided last month to include Moscow among the capitals to which it will send its first ambassadors. This decision was taken largely at the behest of Soudanese leaders, many of whom favor close ties with the bloc.) [REDACTED]

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### The Situation in Japan

Takeo Miki, a leading party rival of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, has made public a proposal for a Diet recess to provide a cooling-off period for President Eisenhower's visit. Miki's plan would require: the opposition Japanese Socialist party to acknowledge the validity of the extension of the Diet session and the lower house's approval of the US-Japanese security treaty; all parties to agree to resume participation in the Diet sessions; a general election after upper-house approval of the treaty, but before the US and Japan exchange ratifications; and Kishi to resign as soon as the Diet approves the treaty.

In a move parallel to Miki's proposal, an independent group in the upper house has renewed negotiations with the major parties for a ten-day "unconditional" truce covering the period of the President's visit. The proposal is designed to avoid the violence that is likely to result from a final vote in the upper house on the treaty--violence the independents feel would adversely affect the climate for the President's arrival.

The Japanese Socialists have said they will again use force to prevent an upper-house vote on the treaty. The government party may call for such a vote sometime between 14 and 17 June. Ambassador MacArthur, however, reports there are indications that the Socialists desire to de-emphasize antitreaty activities and concentrate on Kishi. While they may see in the maneuvers for a compromise an opportunity to retreat from their mass-resignation proposal, which will not affect ratification of the treaty, the party has not yet made any firm decisions on modifying its campaign of continuing demonstrations.

The largest Japanese labor organization, the pro-Communist Sohyo, is planning general strike action on 15 June. Sohyo is calling for 24-hour strikes by private industry unions and two- or three-hour work stoppages by public service workers, including transportation and communications employees. Union leaders hope the strikes will exceed the large-scale action of 4 June, but there is



some doubt that the private unions will participate extensively. Sohyo leaders also may be restrained by their desire to avoid irritating the public excessively.

Prime Minister Kishi appears to be holding firm against pressures for his ouster. He and his supporters apparently hope the current demonstrations will arouse responsible Japanese, who constitute a majority, to restrain the leftist extremists. Kishi's response to any compromise proposal to calm the present turmoil probably will depend to a considerable extent on the strength of the public reaction to the demonstrations. The radical leftists almost certainly have been encouraged by the success of their demonstrations, and more are expected.

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Possibility of Postponement of Next Fall's Opening of UN General Assembly

There is talk among UN delegates about postponing the opening of the General Assembly from 20 September until after the US elections. Thor Thors, head of the Icelandic delegation, told Ambassador Lodge on 9 June that such action would be in the general interest and that other delegations, particularly the Afro-Asians, were in favor of postponement. Thors felt that some of his Scandinavian colleagues were inclined to this view since the failure of the summit meeting. Lodge believes that much of the interest in postponement has been stimulated by the Soviet delegate.

According to British chief delegate Dixon, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold took a very negative attitude with Thors on 9 June when the latter broached the subject to him. Hammarskjold had previously expressed the opinion at a press conference on 2 June that, as matters stood, the session would open on time. He felt then that the need to reduce the cold war, evidenced by the strong Soviet protest to the Security Council on the U-2 plane incident, was an added reason against postponement. According to the Norwegian delegate, however, Hammarskjold will not take any action to oppose postponement.

In 1956, the opening of the 11th session of the General Assembly was postponed to 12 November; one factor in this decision was the fact that debate in the first stages of the 1952 session had been desultory, with many of the delegates marking time until the outcome of the US elections. Lodge expects the issue of postponement this year to come to a head in the next few days. Barring widespread sentiment against postponement, of which there are no indications at this time, chances seem fairly good for a repetition this year of the action taken in 1956.

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